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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
JAl\IES McMAHON,

Case No.
12228

Plaintiff and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The Defendant was arrested for receiving stolen
property.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before a jury in the Second
District Court for Weber County, Judge Calvin Gould,
presiding. The Defendant was convicted by the jury
for receiving stolen property and the Defendant was
then sentenced to imprisonment in the Utah State
Prison for a term not to exceed five years. The Defendant is presently serving his term at the Utah State
Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment
rendered by the lower court and judgment directing a
verdict in favor of the Appellant, as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Some time between January 1, 1969, and June I,
1969, two snowmobiles were taken from Petty Ford
and/ or its successor in interest, Colonial Ford. Eventually these machines were reported to the Salt Lake
City Police Department as stolen. During this period
of time the Appellant, McMahon, was serving time at
the Utah State Prison for a violation of his parole. The
Appellant was admitted to the State Prison on the
above-mentioned parole violation on August 27, 1968,
and was released September 16, 1969.
On the morning of February 2, 1970, as indicated
in the testimony of Detective Webster of the Ogden
Police Department, he observed two snowmobiles on a
trailer in the parking lot of the Mt. Eyrie Racket Club
in Ogden. The detective above-mentioned was able to
obtain serial numbers from the aforementioned snow·
mobiles. He then had the obtained serial numbers
checked by the National Criminal Identification Cen·
ter. The report from the Center was that the snowmo·
biles had been reported as stolen. The detective also
observed two cars parked in the parking lot of the Mt.
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Eyrie Garden Apartments. The detective withdrew to
observe the snowmobiles from a vantage point approximately five hundred feet from the snowmobiles at
a nearby service station. At approvimately 4 :50 a.m. he
observed a white-over-blue Buick leaving the parking
lot of the Mt. Eyrie Garden Apartments. He was unable to positively identify either the car or the driver
at that time. Approximately five minutes later Detective Webster observed two individuals enter into the
remaining car, a black 1966 Ford, and watched them
hook the snowmobile trailer with the above-mentioned
snowmobiles onto the Ford car. He followed these two
individuals with the snowmobiles and requested additional help from the Ogden Police Department. After
trailing the above-mentioned individuals, their car was
stopped and the individuals were taken into custody.
The individuals above-mentioned were State's witnesses,
Hastie and White. On February 5, 1970, Detective
Richard Peterson of the Ogden Police Department
filed a complaint and an arrest warrant was issued and
served on the Appellant, McMahon. The Appellant
was brought before an Ogden City judge for an arraignment on February 6. A preliminary hearing was
requested and held in the Ogden City Court on February 13, 1970. At the conclusion of the preliminary
hearing the Appellant was bound over for trial in the
Second District Court for the County of Weber by
Judge E. Fred Ziegler. A trial date was set. It was
subsequently changed four times, and eventually the
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Appellant was tried on May 7 before Judge Calvin
Gould. The Appellant '}'as represented at this trial by
Attorney L. G. Bingham and Bill Daines. The trial,
however, was declared by Judge Gould as in a state of
mistrial and a new date was set for trial. The case was
tried before a jury on June 9, 10 and 11. The Appellant acted at this trial as his own attorney. The Appellant was convicted by the jury and sentenced on June
16, 1970, by Judge Calvin Gould to imprisonment in
the Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five
years.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WITH THE PROPER APPLICATION OF
THE RULE REQUIRING INDEPENDENT
CORROBORATION OF AN ACCOMPLICE'S
TESTIMONY, THE STATE HAS NOT MET
THE BURDEN OF PROOF REQUIRED BY
UCA 76-38-12, 1953, AS AMENDED.
The Appellant, James McMahon, was convicted
for receiving stolen property, 76-38-12 UCA 1953, as
amended. The aforementioned statute states:
Every person who, for his own gain or to prevent the owner from again possessing his
property, buys or receives any personal property exceeding $50 in value, knowing the same
to have been stolen, is punishable by imprison-
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ment in the state prison not exceeding five
years; if the value of the property so bought
or received is $50 or less in value, he is guilty
of a misdemeanor.
The elements of the above-mentioned crime as defined
In 4.5 Am. Jur., Receiving Stolen Property, Section 2,
are: 1) The actual receiving of, 2) Property actually
stolen from an owner, 3) The receiver knowing at the
time that the property was stolen, and 4) Receiving the
property with knowledge and felonious intent. The
State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant did commit the above-mentioned elements of the crime. In State v. Thomas, 121 U. 639,
244 P2d. 653, this court held that the defendant does
not have the burden of proving his innocence and that
the State must prove that the property was stolen and
that the defendant had possession.

It is the contention of the Appellant that the State
has not met its burden of proof requirement in respect
to the actual receiving of stolen property by the Appellant McMahon. The State has attempted to prove possession of the stolen property by the testimony of
Hastie and White, the record is full of their testimony;
however, 77-31-18 UCA, 1953, as amended, defines
Utah's position as to the testimony of accomplices:
A conviction shall not be had on the testimony
of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by
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other evidence which in itself and without the
aid of the testimony of the accomplice tends
to connect the defendant with the commission
of the offense; and the corroboration shall not
be sufficient, if it merely shows the commission of the offert5e or the circumstances thereof.
A conviction cannot stand if it is based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. An accomplice
was defined by this court in State v. Coroles, 74 U. 94.
277 P. 203, as a "person who knowingly, voluntarily
and with common intent with the principal offender,
united in the commission of the crime. The cooperation
in the crime must be real, not merely apparent." In
State v. Davie, 121 U 184, 240 P2d 263, the Court defined an accomplice as one who could be charged as a
principal. Since the record indicates that it was Hastie
and White who were arrested with the stolen property
in their possession, it is obvious that they are accomplices and as such, in order to convict the Appellant, the
accomplices' testimony must be sufficiently corroborated.
The above-mentioned statute requires that the testimony of an accomplice be corroborated by evidence
which "tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense." The corroboration must show more
than the commission of the offense or the circumstances
thereof. In State 'V. Lay, 38 U. 143, 110 P. 986, the
Court formulated a rule stating that corroborating evi-
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dence is insufficient where it merely casts a grave
/ suspicion on the accused. The Lay rule has been accepted as the general rule in subsequent cases, State v. Vigil,
123 U. 495, 260 P2d 539, 541 and State v. Simpson, 120
U. 596, 236 P2d 1097, where the court added: "Corroborative evidence need not be sufficient to support a
conviction, but evidence must implicate the defendant
in the offense and be consistent with his guilt and in/ consistent with his innocence and must do more than
cast a grave suspicion."

I
I

Possession of stolen property has been ruled by
Utah Courts as being corroborative evidence, State v.
Vigil, 123 U. 495, 260 P2d 539; however, that possession must be accurate. conscious and personal, State v.
Dyett, 114 U. 379. 199 P2d 155. The corroborating evidence is not sufficient when it relates only to prior or
subsequent criminal or similar type acts, State v. Kimball, 45 U. 443, 146 P 313. It should be noted also that
the confession of the defendant cannot be treated as
corroborative; the court held in State v. Ferry, 2 U2d
271, 275 P2d 173, that an accused cannot be convicted
on his confession alone: "We believe and hold that in
addition there must be independent, clear and convincing evidence of the corpus delicti, although we and the
authorities generally do not require it to be convincing
beyond a reasonable doubt .... Our traditional goal in
safeguarding the rights of an accused would preclude
conviction on such an unsubstantial basis."
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In State v. Somers, 97 U. 132, 90 P2d 273, 274, i ev
the court summarized the rule of accomplice testimony I ac

corroboration by saying:
While it is a question for the jury to determine
whether corroborative evidence is sufficient,
in connection with the testimony of any accomplice, to justify a conviction, yet unless
there is corroborative evidence of a material
fact tending to connect the defendant with the
commission of the crime, a court should direct
a verdict for the defendant." (emphasis added)

H
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n

I
II

A review of the State's case shows that there has
not been sufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony
of the accomplices Hastie and White that McMahon
has possession of the stolen property. Webster, an of- \
ficer in the Ogden Police Dept., testified that he was
one of the arresting officers of White and Hastie. He
had seen them come from McMahon's apartment, that
the snowmobiles were on a trailer pulled by a car driven
by \Vhite. This testimony certainly does not show accurate, conscious and personal possession of stolen
property on the part of the Appellant. Bean, an employee of Colonial Ford identified the snowmobiles
that were found in the possession of White and Hastie
as the property of Colonial Ford. Petersen, a Detective
of the Ogden Police Dept., testified as to the statements of the accomplices; i.e., that he believed their
statements to be true. This is certainly not independent
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i evidence, but an inadmissible conclusion concerning the
1

accomplices' testimony. The two prospective buyers,
Hubble and Bishop, could not identify McMahon or
his voice as the person attempting to make the arrangements. The testimony of Stratford as to the confession
of McMahon will be treated in the next point of argument; however, in Ferry, a confession was ruled to be
insufficient corroboration to uphold a conviction.
In all of the above testimony, it is submitted that
there is not sufficient independent corroboration of the
accomplices' testimony to show that McMahon had possession of the stolen snowmobiles. This is the most es··
sential element that the State must prove to obtain a
conviction for violation of 76-38-12 UCA, 1953, as
amended. The lower court was in error by not requiring stricter instructions as to the effect of 77-31-18,
UCA, 1953, as amended, and for failing to direct a
verdict for the defendant as the court did in the Somers
case.
POINT II

THE LOWER COURT WAS IN ERROR
TO ALLOW CERTAIN EVIDENCE TO BE
SUBMITTED WHICH ADMISSION WAS A
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE APPELLANT.
A basic premise in criminal proceedings is that the
State must prove the defendant's guilt. The State is
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required to prove the defendant's guilt without self.
incrimination by the Defendant, USCA Const. Amend.
5. In order to be sure that the Defendant has a fair
trial, the Constitution provides that the defendant has
a right to have the counsel of an attorney, USCA
Const. Amend. 6. Our State has enacted a special section that also guarantees to the defendant that he is
entitled to a fair trial, 77-1-8 UCA 1953, as amended.
Our courts have formulated a general rule that there
must be a substantial observance of the rights and privileges of the defendant so that his treatment conforms
with commonly accepted standards of decency and fairness, State v. Hamilton, 18 U. 2d 234, 419 P2d 770.
In this case, the Appellant acted as attorney prose.
'Ve do not state that it was error for the court to allow
him to proceed in this manner; however, it does create
the possibility that evidence which should not be entered
will be improperly considered by the jury. Generally
our courts have shown such concern for the fair treat·
ment of the defendant that they have required the defendant to have an attorney. In the case of State v. Hillstrom, .. U .. , 150 P 9.35, the defendant tried to fire
his counsel and then the court appointed them as amici
curiae to conduct examinations of the witnesses and to
protect the rights of the defendant.
The most often used form of self-incrimination is
an admission or a confession. In the case of State v.
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ILouden, 15 U2d 64, 387 P2d 240, Vacated 85 S.Ct. 87,
!379 U.S. 1, 13 L.Ed 2d 23, it was stated that the trial
court has a duty to adopt and follow procedure which
will guard against admission of spurious confessions or
admissions. The landmark case about the admission of
aconfession is Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 426, 86 S.
Ct 1602, 16 L. Ed 2d 694, 10 ALR 3d 97 4. Miranda
clearly holds that the defendant has a constitutional
right to the assistance of counsel and the protection
against self-incrimination, USCA Const Amends 5 &
6. To protect the individual's rights, the Miranda warnJ ing has been required to be given to each individual
taken into custody by the authorities. This warning states
that the individual has the right to remain silent, that
anything he may say may be used against him in a court
of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that an attorney will be provided if necessary.
The Supreme Court summarized its position by saying:

I

We hold that when an individual is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
by authorities in any significant way and is subject to questioning, the privilege against selfincrimination is jeopardized and procedural
safeguards must be employed to protect that
privilege.-page 1630
According to Miranda, the awareness of the right
to remain silent is the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to the exercise of this right. High
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standards of proof are also required to show that the
defendant or individual has waived his right to remain
silent. The defendant's failure to object to the introduction of a confession at trial was not a waiver of the
claim of constitutional inadmissability and did not preclude the Supreme Court's consideration of the issue in
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 US 478, 84 S.Ct. 758, 12
L.Ed2d 977. In a recent Utah case this court has held
that where there is questioning in custody by police officers, the prosecution has the burden of showing that
the accused knowingly waived his privilege against selfincrimination and the right of counsel, State v. Lopez,
22 U2d 257, 451P2d772.
In the present case, while the Defendant was in
custody, the testimony of District Attorney Stratford,
R209, was that the Defendant confessed that he was
guilty. There is no indication in the record that the Defendant was advised of his constitutional rights. The
testimony of Stratford was not offered in the first trial
in May when the Defendant was defended by counsel.
There was no attempt by the court in the present case
to determine if the Defendant was aware of his right to
remain silent in reference to the admission of the confession and we submit that the trial court committed
reversable error by allowing the confession to be admitted without requiring the state to prove that the
Defendant had knowingly waived his constitutional
right against self-incrimination.
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CONCLUSION

1

The State has failed to prove that the Appellant
had possession of the stolen snowmobiles. The State
tried to prove this by the testimony of Hastie and
White, both of whom are accomplices. Their testimony
was not independently corroborated as required by 7731-18 UCA 1953, as amended; therefore, it is submitted
that the court committed reversable error by not directing the verdict for the Defendant.
The court further committed reversable error when
it did not require safeguarding procedures to be used
by the State to protect the Defendant's constitutional
right against self-incrimination. The failure of the
State to show that the Defendant had consciously and
knowingly waived his right to remain silent was a serious breach of the procedures required to protect the
right against self-incrimination; therefore, this court is
urged to reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Respectfully submitted,
FRED W. FINLINSON

Attorney for Appellant

